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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This article first traces the genesis of an “agrarian discourse” in its Scottish context in 
the eighteenth century through the work of various theorists and agriculturalists - 
primarily Henry Home, Lord Kames - while linking it to the rise of stadial theorising 
about the course of human development. Secondly, the paper will trace how a particular 
conception of property was in many ways theoretically contingent upon thinking about 
land in an agrarian context. What will be termed the “agricultural argument” 
encompasses the proposition that in order to establish property in land – though a 
specific form of individual, exclusive property right – cultivation or agriculture was 
seen to be a necessary prerequisite within the realms of stadial theory.1 Such an 
agricultural argument is a commonplace in Australian historiography in relation to why 
indigenous interests in land were not recognised in the early colonial period and beyond. 
However, its specific late eighteenth-century form - expressed through a particular 
Scottish idiom of landed property and stadialism - has often been neglected in favour of 
its Lockean relations and will form the basis of this paper.  
Scottish stadial theorising is particularly interesting to trace within the 
Australian colonial context because of the perceived complete lack of agricultural land 
use on the part of indigenous inhabitants.2 Consequently, arguments relating to 
cultivation as opposed to the indigenous hunting economy are highlighted by the very 
contrast they provide. Furthermore, the character of debates in New South Wales about 
the best form of land use for the colonists to pursue, pastoralism or agriculture, offered 
an ironic twist to the question of indigenous relationships to land. The stadial sequence 
with its varying modes of subsistence could arguably be seen in three different stages in 
one relatively small colonial possession. 
 
 
II  AGRARIAN DISCOURSE 
 
 
Both agricultural and improvement discourse have long been seen as significant within 
Britain’s domestic history. However, their applications, influence and mutations are 
only beginning to be noticed in the broader imperial sphere, particularly within the 
second British empire, post-1780. As Richard Drayton has recently argued, the notion 
of “the improvement of the world” was related in complex ways to the domestic 
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improvement movement, and also that an “imperialism of ‘improvement’” ordered 
“enclosure at home and expansion abroad”.3 C A Bayly has also argued that an 
“agrarian patriotism”, related to the moral and practical significance of agriculture in 
Britain, and specifically Scotland, was a key doctrine of empire in the late eighteenth 
century.4 Both accounts are richly suggestive of a broader imperial agricultural or 
agrarian discourse which, though closely integrated into the domestic improvement 
movement, was flexible enough to act as one of the foundational assumptions of British 
colonisation in New South Wales. 
 
Definitions 
 
“Agrarian discourse” encompassed a wide range of thought associated with ideas 
concerning developing scientific methods of agriculture along with agricultural practice 
in the eighteenth-century British context. However, most relevant for present purposes 
are the theoretical constructions of the significance of agriculture in the path towards 
human and social development in short stadialism within Scottish thought. This paper 
traces the latter aspect of this agrarian discourse, specifically the way in which agrarian 
categories were ordered in the hierarchical schema of conceptions of property within 
stadial theory. 
 
The Agricultural Argument 
 
The contours of the argument were simple. In order to establish property in land, 
cultivation was necessary. It also involved a very specific form of individual, exclusive 
property interest, opposed to common or usufructary rights. As is well known, in stadial 
theory, property passed through several stages as society was seen to progress from an 
economy or mode of subsistence based upon hunting, to pastoralism, then agriculture 
and finally the highest commercial stage.5 Forms of personal property could exist in the 
hunting or pastoral stages. Landed property, however, was seen to emerge only with 
agriculture, as were recognisable government and law.6  
 
The Agricultural Approach in Stadial Theory 
 
The moment of transformation in terms of conceptions of property in land arrived with 
agriculture in stadial theory. Kames noted that “[a]griculture, which makes the third 
stage of the social life, produced the relation of land-property”.7 Other theorists held 
similar views. John Millar wrote that agriculture “obliges men to fix their residence in 
the neighbourhood of that spot where their labour is chiefly to be employed, and thereby 
gives rise to property in land, the most valuable and permanent species of wealth”.8 
Robertson wrote that the “institution suited to the ideas and exigencies of tribes, which 
subsist chiefly by fishing and hunting, and which have as yet acquired but an imperfect 
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conception of any species of property, will be much more simple than those which must 
take place when the earth is cultivated with regular industry, and a right of property not 
only in its productions, but in the soil itself, is completely ascertained”.9  
Robertson, in keeping with other theorists, placed significant qualifications on 
what exactly was able to constitute the kind of agriculture that produced conceptions of 
property in the full agricultural stage. It had to form the main or primary mode of 
subsistence. In his analysis of Native Americans in North America he elaborated at 
some length. In America, Robertson noted that “we scarcely meet with any nation of 
hunters, which does not practise some species of cultivation”.10 However, he observed 
that for the Native Americans hunting or fishing remained the main occupation, and 
such agriculture is “neither extensive nor laborious. As game and fish are their principal 
food, all they aim at by cultivation, is to supply any occasional defect of these”.11 Smith 
likewise explained in his Lectures on Jurisprudence that the “women plant a few stalks 
of Indian corn at the back of their huts. But this can hardly be called agriculture”.12 The 
land was not regarded as having been appropriated, as it was not enclosed, used 
individually, or upon a large and regular scale. More importantly, it involved no great 
expenditure of industry or labour. Necessity would ultimately (though not yet) surmount 
“the abhorrence of labour natural to savage nations” to compel them “to have recourse 
to culture, as subsidiary to hunting”.13 Industry and labour were regarded as crucial 
aspects of the emergence of private property in land in the agricultural stage. Such 
“savage nations” lacked “industry or foresight” to the extent thought necessary for the 
immediate progression to the full agricultural stage.14 
 
 
III  INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY 
 
 
Property signified “a peculiar relation betwixt a person and certain subjects”.15 It was 
essentially an individual relationship. Kames further explained that a “man who has 
bestowed labour in preparing a field for the plough, and who has improved that field by 
artful culture, forms in his mind an intimate connection with it. He contracts by degrees 
a singular affection for a spot, which in a manner is the workmanship of his own 
hands”.16 Though land in common is noted at several points throughout his texts, this 
form of tenure is associated both with backwardness and a poorly developed society and 
mode of subsistence.  
When societies remained hunters or shepherds property could be nothing other 
than common. Kames argued that there could be no conception of property in land prior 
to the agricultural stage. “In the first two stages of the social life, while men were 
                                                 
9  Robertson, The History of America (6 ed, 1792), vol II, 111.  
10  Ibid at 117.  
11  Ibid at 117-118. 
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13  Robertson, supra note 9, 117.  
14  Ibid at 117. James Anderson also saw industry as crucial: “The highest benefits that man derives 
from civil institutions, are safety to his person, and security of property; and human industry is 
always found to be nearly in proportion to the degree in which these privileges are enjoyed in 
every country on the globe” in Anderson, Essays Relating to Agriculture and Rural Affairs 
(1777) vol III, 90.  
15  Home, supra note 7, 88-89. 
16  Ibid at 104.  
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hunters or shepherds, there scarce could be any notion of land-property”.17 They were 
“[s]trangers to agriculture… [and] wandered about in hords [sic], to find pasture for 
their cattle”.18 Without precise attachment to a determinate piece of land, Kames argued 
that in “this vagrant life, men had scarce any connection with land more than with air or 
water”.19 The metaphoric quality of this sentence lies in his comparison of land with 
things that are paradigmatic common resources. Robertson agreed with Kames that 
hunters could have no conception of property in land. “Nations which depend upon 
hunting are, in a great measure, strangers to the idea of property”.20 Adam Ferguson 
divided the ages prior to the agricultural stage into the savage and the barbarian. 
Hunters remained savages, while shepherds graduated to the category of barbarian. The 
distinction is relevant to capacity for or presence of property in each. The “savage…is 
not yet acquainted with property”, while the “barbarian” is aware of property though not 
“ascertained by laws”, it is “a principle object of care and desire”.21 Those who “intrust 
[sic] their subsistence chiefly to hunting, fishing, or the natural produce of the 
soil…have little attention to property, and scarcely any beginnings of subordination or 
government”.22 For Ferguson the only “subjects of property” to the hunter will be “the 
arms, the utensils, and the fur, which the individual carries”.23  
 
Civic Humanism versus Natural Jurisprudence 
 
Within intellectual history it is generally accepted that two particular languages are 
important for our understanding of the Scottish Enlightenment: civic humanism and 
natural jurisprudence.24 The two interpretations have largely remained independent of 
each other, and John Pocock has pointed to this problem.25 Many historians, following 
the work of Pocock, have tended to focus upon the former language in eighteenth-
century Scotland.26 However, the language of natural jurisprudence was also widely 
used in this period, particularly in the context of early modern natural law thinking, 
which constituted an important influence on the development of Scottish stadial theory. 
Stadial thinkers, including Kames, may be read within this language of natural 
jurisprudence. 
Though the agricultural argument typical of stadial theory echoed John Locke’s 
labour theory of property, the sequential movement through four distinct stages and the 
definition of property interests in each marked it out as a novel conception of property 
expressed in a Scottish stadial vernacular.27 Jane Rendall has noted that Adam Smith 
and John Millar no longer used the state of nature and the original contract as 
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“Natural Jurisprudence in the Scottish Enlightenment: Summary of an Interpretation” in 
MacCormick and Bankowski (eds) Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution (1989) 36.  
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26  See for example Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (1985); Phillipson, 
“Propriety, property and prudence: David Hume and the defence of the Revolution” in Phillipson 
and Skinner (eds) Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (1993) 302-320. 
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explanatory tools, but rather depended on changes in the economic bases of society to 
explain development and progression.28 Kames likewise favoured alternative 
explanations. A perennial problem within accounts of the emergence of society and 
property in the natural law or natural jurisprudential tradition had been the question of 
the original appropriation of property. Devices such as the state of nature and original 
contracts had earlier guided theorists out of this quagmire, though Kames managed to 
avoid it altogether with, first, his evolutionary grasp of societal development, and 
secondly, his Pufendorfian conception of natural sociability which precluded the sharp 
division between a solitary primeval state of nature and a later compact which drove so-
called solitary man into civil society. In the Sketches he argued that “there is in man an 
appetite for society, never has been called into question”.29 The fact that “men are 
endued with an appetite for society” he illustrates by reference to the “inhabitants of that 
part of New Holland which Dampier saw”.30 Even they “live in society, tho’ less 
advanced above brutes than any other known savages; and so intimate is their society, 
that they gather their food, and eat, in common”.31 Kames’ underlying notion of 
property as a gradually evolving individual moral sense (as well as a material fact) 
avoided the question of consent for the division of property – a perennial problem in the 
Lockean and Grotian versions of original appropriation. 
 
 
IV  QUESTIONS WITHIN AUSTRALIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Arguments about indigenous peoples’ property rights – or the lack of such – in the early 
years of British colonisation have been a longstanding issue within Australian 
historiography. Though the question has become a central element of historical debate 
since the emergence of Aboriginal histories from the 1970s, prior historical narratives 
tended to subsume the question into a national story of progress in which British 
settlement was an unquestioned given within this body of thinking. In effect, indigenes’ 
rights were a non-issue as they themselves were effectively written out of national 
Australian histories from the early decades of the twentieth century. If the issue was 
addressed, indigenes were regarded to have no such property rights as a result of their 
purported “savage” state, most often identified by their nomadism and failure to 
cultivate the soil. In W E H Stanner’s now famous phrase, a “great Australian silence” 
had developed around indigenes. He defined this as “a structural matter, a view from a 
window which has been carefully placed to exclude a whole quadrant of the landscape. 
What may have begun as a simple forgetting…turned under habit and over time into 
something like a cult of forgetfulness practised on a national scale”.32  
This perspective is relevant to the question of property rights given the implicit 
agreement amongst historians of Australia prior to the 1970s that the aborigines were 
disqualified from possessing property rights due to their non-agriculturalist status.33 As 
Australia’s indigenes were written out of a national historical narrative, the justifications 
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that had most often underpinned their dispossession from the continent – namely the 
agricultural argument – also became an implicit element of these narratives and were 
generally not specifically enunciated.34  
Henry Reynolds’ The Law of the Land was written in opposition to such a 
dominant historical narrative, and it is not surprising that he chose to combat the 
agriculturalist argument through the view that a form of indigenous possessory title 
could (and should) have been recognised by the British government on the 
contemporary criteria of both international and the English common law in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.35  
Reynolds sought to make two main arguments in favour of the recognition of 
indigenous rights to land by officials in the Colonial Office and contemporary settlers. 
The first can be characterised as a kind of possessory title argument: that the indigenes 
could be considered to have been in possession of their land in the European sense of 
the term upon British colonisation in 1788. He marshalled extensive evidence from 
jurists who wrote between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries to support his view, 
which was based on principles of possession and occupation in both the English 
common law and international law.36 Reynolds was arguing against the agricultural 
argument, and in consequence tended to overstate the evidence supporting what may be 
termed his possession-based property argument. His second argument was based upon a 
reading of evidence which he argued suggested that certain, limited, interests in land 
were recognised by contemporaries. However, he failed to adequately distinguish the 
range and diverse kinds of property interests which contemporary sources employed. 
Reynolds failed to sufficiently contextualise the theories of property of the time with 
which he was dealing. This problem seems to be a result of the fact that our 
understanding of such theories and conceptions of differing kinds of property have not 
been properly analysed in historical work to date.  
In relation to the earlier period of discovery and settlement, Reynolds did not 
pay sufficient attention to the intellectual context, particularly when assessing which 
body of law or ideas may have been thought to apply to indigenous peoples in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He anachronistically assumed that principles 
of possession that governed English law would (or should) be applied in a context 
where indigenous or native peoples were commonly regarded to exist in a lower state of 
existence or what some liked to call a state of nature.37 Reynolds spent only two pages 
on stadial theory, though references to the agricultural argument were studded 
throughout the text.38 He did acknowledge the omissions in his own argument to some 
extent, when he wrote “[t]heir occupation, their possession was overlooked for two 
distinct reasons – European ignorance and European philosophical ideas”.39 He briefly 
referred to these ideas in a section in Chapter One entitled “A State of Primeval 
                                                 
34  See for example Evatt, “The Legal Foundations of New South Wales” (1938) 11 ALJ 409, in 
which the indigenes were not mentioned at all. Other, more historical, works also contained few 
references in the same period. See, for example, Scott, A Short History of Australia (1916, 
reprinted 1950); Shaw, The Story of Australia (1955); Pike, Australia: The Quiet Continent 
(1962). For a general appraisal of the presence and treatment of indigenous peoples in Australian 
historical work during the twentieth century, see Broome, “Historians, Aborigines and Australia: 
writing the national past”, in Attwood (ed) In The Age of Mabo (1996) 54.  
35  Reynolds, The Law of the Land (2 ed, 1992).  
36  Ibid at 7-54.  
37  See, for example, Cook’s view that “[w]e are to Consider that we see this Country in the pure 
state of Nature, the Industry of man has had nothing to do with any part of I” in Cook, supra note 
2, 396. 
38  Reynolds, supra note 35, 24-25.  
39  Ibid at 22. 
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Simplicity”, yet his references were brief and did not provide sufficient context – 
particularly why such thinking proved dominant in relation to British perceptions of the 
indigenous lack of property interests. 
Despite the lack of weight Reynolds accorded to the agricultural argument, it 
remained as a subtext throughout the book, in the sense that he was constantly 
attempting to combat its influence as an underlying assumption of attitudes towards the 
indigenous capacity for property rights, as outlined earlier in relation to dominant 
twentieth-century historical narratives. At the heart of his argument was the belief that 
he was rescuing a forgotten tradition of oppositional voices.40 “A minority of settlers 
took the view that the Aborigines were… the proper, the legitimate owners of the soil 
and British usurpers and brigands”.41 However, and this qualification is crucial, the 
“great majority continued to accept that Europeans had a right to colonize the world, to 
turn ‘waste’ lands to better use and to subdue and replenish the earth”.42 While Reynolds 
understandably devoted his book to recovering and mapping the contours of this lost 
tradition, the consequence was that dominant attitudes towards property and indigenous 
society were, in turn, submerged under the weight of evidence he mobilised in favour of 
his own position. Through a process which may be seen as a corrective, I explore the 
theoretical genealogy of views concerned with an agrarian vision of landed property 
which assisted in ensuring that the possessory principles Reynolds outlined were not 
generally used in the early Australian context.  
 
 
V  THE LAW OF NATIONS AND OCCUPATION VERSUS CULTIVATION 
 
 
While agriculture was central to accounts of the stadial progression of societies, and as 
such was often regarded as necessary in order to establish proprietary rights over land, 
in the contemporary context of the law of nations jurists were divided over the criteria 
or acts necessary for so-called savage or indigenous peoples to have established 
property over the lands on which they were variously seen to either “range over” (in 
terms of so-called nomadic peoples) or to occupy. It was a complex debate, yet in 
essence may be reduced to two main arguments. As Reynolds and others including Kent 
McNeil have argued,43 it appears that the majority tended towards the view that 
occupation sufficed (leaving aside the vexed point of whether such occupation 
established communal or individual interests in land; let alone the evolving concept of 
sovereignty) though a strand of thought in the eighteenth century most often identified 
with the Swiss jurist Vattel demanded that only agricultural land use could establish 
indigenes’ rights to the exclusion of other, colonial, nations.44 
Thus the intellectual bounds of such arguments may be reduced to two main 
headings: first, an occupation- or possession-based conception of property; and second, 
a cultivation-based conception. The latter, expressed through a particular form of 
agrarian discourse within Scottish stadial theory in the late eighteenth-century, was 
often echoed by early observers and colonists when discussing the lack of indigenous 
                                                 
40  This theme (almost Thompsonian in its sensitivity to resurrecting the perspectives of the losers 
of history) runs throughout his books. Also see Reynolds, Frontier: Aborigines, Settlers and 
Land (1987). 
41  Reynolds, supra note 35, 73. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. See also McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (1989). 
44  De Vattel, The Law of Nations (2 ed, 1834). 
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capacity or ability to possess land in a recognisably private, individual and exclusive 
manner – primarily as a result of their ignorance of the arts of agriculture.45 Though 
clearly having precursors who used a similar “agricultural argument” (Locke as well as 
Vattel) it was increasingly expressed in a Scottish idiom of agrarian property that drew 
upon the language of natural jurisprudence within the stadial tradition. The Scottish 
stadial vernacular is important precisely because it constituted a discourse or idiom 
within, and emanating from, the British empire that provided an apposite explanation 
and justification of how and why colonies of “settlement” from the late eighteenth-
century could be appropriated into British hands. 
Although the two discourses existed side by side, the question that remains is 
which contemporary observers most often applied to Australia’s indigenous peoples. 
The following will answer this question by way of an analysis of both as used by the 
Scottish philosopher Lord Kames, and point to the different contexts in which the two 
discourses operated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
 
 
VI  HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES 
 
 
Lord Kames’ work is interesting primarily for his use of divergent justifications and 
emphases when discussing landed property in different texts and contexts. He used two 
distinct idioms of property in his texts – the agrarian natural jurisprudential idiom and 
the occupation/possession idiom. Each placed varying emphases upon the criteria 
thought necessary to establish and justify landed property, and the former constituted an 
integral part of a widespread “agrarian discourse” that has been detailed above. Through 
Kames’s intermixture of philosophy, legal theory, and practical agricultural writings, he 
developed a form of stadial theory that was heavily dependent upon natural 
jurisprudential narratives for the course of human development. As such, his view of 
property, established in an original theoretical sense, of original appropriation (of lands 
from the theoretical “common”), rested more upon the criterion of cultivation than what 
may be seen as the competing criteria of possession and occupation.46  
Kames’ most comprehensive versions of stadialism are in the Historical Law 
Tracts (1758) and Sketches of the History of Man (1774).47 While his earliest and most 
interesting account was in the Tracts, a brief comparison with the Sketches suggests that 
the two should be understood within different contexts. In R L Meek’s so-called 
“materialist” interpretation of stadial theory, the Tracts are seen as a standard account.48 
While this is true of its general outlines, it appears that the role of Kames’ moral 
philosophy has not been adequately understood in his stadial conceptualisation of the 
progression of society through the development of the sense of property. His account in 
the Sketches is a much more materialist version, drawing extensively upon typical 
material aspects such as food, population, climate and necessity that are seen to operate 
                                                 
45  See supra note 2. 
46  Kames’ significance extends to his place within a tradition of Scottish agricultural writers who 
melded agrarian theory and practice, including James Anderson, James Hutton and Sir John 
Sinclair, all of whom in various ways further developed Kames’ agricultural and improving 
visions, continuing the Scots agrarian intellectual and practical tradition, and in turn the 
dissemination of “agrarian discourse”, within both Britain and Scotland, as well as the wider 
colonial realm. 
47  Home, supra note 7; Home, supra note 29. 
48  Meek, supra note 5, 102-6.  
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as factors driving a society from one mode of subsistence to the next.49 In the Tracts, 
these elements are largely neglected in favour of a history of the individual moral sense 
– in essence the development of the individual’s capacity for civilised existence. This is 
in turn itself a history of the emergence of law, property and government, where the 
appearance of such institutions is only made possible by the emergence of the 
individual’s capacity for these elements of civilisation. 
However, both emphases are important in different ways in explaining the 
progression of different aspects of society and the individual’s (and thus society’s as a 
whole) capacity for property, law and government. In material terms, an increase in 
population will put pressure on a people to seek out a new mode of subsistence, as will 
elements such as climate and forms of foods available in the general environment. In 
contrast, Kames’s chapter on property in the Tracts is overtly concerned to explain the 
emergence of conceptions of property, at first outside the realm of law or government, 
but ultimately progressing towards sophisticated juristic relationships in the agricultural 
and then the commercial agricultural stages of society. 
The apparent paradox concerning Kames’ emphasis upon agriculture is that in 
the Tracts, when he delved into modern practical issues in Scots, English and Roman 
law, the relevant principles of possession and occupation were far more prominent than 
those of cultivation.50 When he discussed existing legal systems and legal problems, 
laws governing the ordering and transmission of landed property rights – which were 
for the most part based upon principles of occupation – came into play. On the other 
hand, when he was engaged in a discussion, description or conjecture upon a society not 
yet governed by a sophisticated or indeed any legal system (or government) at all, the 
language of natural jurisprudence, and cultivation, became prominent. Such a 
dichotomy echoed the division between an agrarian conception of property in land in 
which only cultivation was held to confer full rights of property in the soil, and the well-
established principles of most legal systems in Europe in this period. In short, in a 
society past the agricultural stage – with full institutions of property, government and a 
developed system of law – the principles of possession and occupation were seen to 
apply. Yet, with a so-called “savage” society that was perceived to be pre-agricultural, 
principles governing the development of societies in an embryonic early stage were 
thought relevant. In pre-agrarian societies, only cultivation could constitute a claim over 
land that would be recognised within the bounds of this theoretical schema of 
stadialism. 
 
 
VII  CONCLUSION 
 
 
It is through a reading of one Scottish theorist of the eighteenth-century that we can see 
how the two arguments of cultivation and occupation-based property interrelate, and 
more importantly, interact, when indigenous peoples are situated and categorised within 
stadialism as below the level of a propertied agrarian society with recognisably 
European-style government and laws. It is these two distinct arguments that run through 
the work of both certain contemporary Scottish stadial theorists and the historiography, 
best characterised by Reynolds’s work, discussed above. It is important to understand 
their interrelationship, particularly within the context of stadialism and agrarian 
                                                 
49  Home, “Progress of Food and Population” in supra note 7, vol I, 85.  
50  For example his discussion of the transfer of goods, title and the bona fide purchaser: Home, 
supra note 29, 92-93. 
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discourse, not only in terms of an historiographical revision of Reynolds’s work, but 
also in terms of understanding eighteenth-century theoretical constructions of indigenes 
within a sensitively reconstructed historical context.  
